



UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 01642263 6



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation

**BOLSHEVIK AIMS AND IDEALS**  
**AND**  
**RUSSIA'S REVOLT AGAINST**  
**BOLSHEVISM**



## THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

"The Round Table" is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in all parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of Imperial politics, entirely free from the bias of local party issues, together with articles dealing with foreign and inter-Imperial problems from the Imperial point of view. In keeping with this policy, opinions and articles of a party character are rigidly excluded. The affairs of "The Round Table" in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. In this way "The Round Table" reflects the current opinions of all parts about Imperial problems, and at the same time presents a survey of them as a whole.

*Issued March, June, September  
and December of each year  
Single copies, \$ .80*

FOR SALE IN THE UNITED STATES BY  
**THE MACMILLAN COMPANY**  
64-66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK.

**Bolshevik Aims and Ideals**  
AND  
**Russia's Revolt Against  
Bolshevism**

REPRINTED FROM  
**THE ROUND TABLE**

**New York**  
**THE MACMILLAN COMPANY**  
**1919**

*All rights reserved*

153679  
22/12/10





## BOLSHEVIK AIMS AND IDEALS

*"The chief task which we set ourselves at the very beginning of the war was to turn the Imperialistic war into a civil war."*—Lenin and Zinovieff, *Against the Current* (Petrograd, 1918).

*"Not civil peace, but civil war — that is our watchword."*—From a letter of Liebknecht to the Zimmerwald Conference.

*"The programme of the Communist party (Bolsheviks) is the programme not only of the liberation of the proletariat of one country. It is the programme of the liberation of the proletariat of all countries, because it is the programme of international revolution. The overthrow of Imperialist governments by means of armed revolt is the road to the international dictatorship of the working-class."*—Bucharin, *Programme of the Communists* (Moscow, 1918).

IN spite of all that has been written on the subject of Bolshevism there still exists in this

country a deplorable and altogether regrettable ignorance on the part of the general public regarding the character, individuality, and aims of the Bolshevik movement. The nature of the information which appears in our daily Press is so contradictory and the frequent change of policy, or rather the absence of any policy, on the part of the Allied Governments so bewildering that the man in the street is inclined to abandon all hope of ever understanding the complex picture which Russia now presents and to isolate from his intellectual vision a problem which, unless it is speedily settled, will submerge Europe in all the horrors of a civil war and render the task of the Peace Conference sterile.

Our ignorance of the Bolshevik movement is perhaps not altogether unnatural. In the fierce heat of the civil war which is at present ravaging Eastern Europe it is hard for those Russians who are opposed to the Bolsheviks to suppress the feelings of bitterness which rise in their heart every time the word "Bolshevik" is mentioned; there are unfortunately only very few who possess the requisite knowledge to treat the question in a scientific and authoritative manner. The problem is rendered still more difficult by the wide divergence of political opinion which exists amongst the Bolsheviks' opponents, who range



from extreme reactionaries to international Socialists of the type of Axelrode and Martoff.

In the absence of a united statement on the part of all the Russian parties a tendency has arisen in this country to divide sympathies with or against the Bolsheviks on purely party lines. The anti-Bolshevik campaign has been conducted mainly by that section of the Press which is most open to attack on the score of capitalistic bias and commercial interest. It is also the section which is most opposed to concessions to Labour. Its campaign, too, has not always been conducted impartially and has not always been free from a suspicion of secret sympathy with the old regime. Rumours have been published which have afterwards had to be denied, and there has been a most unfortunate misuse in the application of the epithet "Bolshevik" to parties and individuals in this country who have not only nothing in common with the Bolsheviks, but have frequently been denounced in the Bolshevik official Press in Russia as renegades and Socialist-traitors. One consequence of this campaign has been to produce in Labour and Radical circles a deep-rooted suspicion of all information emanating from that section of the Press and a tendency to regard the Bolsheviks as the champions of democracy against autocracy. The reaction thus

produced has resulted in a most unfortunate confusion of ideas, which has been further increased by the vexed question of Allied intervention.

If those newspapers have grossly exaggerated the German character of the Bolshevik movement, the Labour and Radical Press has been equally guilty in its attempts to "whitewash" the Bolsheviks as the protagonists of democracy and open diplomacy. To-day, we all recognise the futility of labelling Lenin a German agent, but it is of paramount importance that such "shibboleths" as "Bolshevism means nothing more than the rule of the majority" should be denounced and exposed. Indeed, the most casual reference to the official Bolshevik Press will prove that many apologists for the Bolsheviks have endeavored to attribute to the Bolshevik leaders characteristics which the latter themselves would be the first to denounce and to cover with derision.

The need in this country for a purely historical analysis of the Bolshevik movement is most urgent, and, although a question of this importance can only be treated properly in a work of considerable magnitude, the object of the following article is to give, as fairly as possible, a brief outline of the origin, aims, and ideals of the men who have been responsible for the Bolshevik experiment in Russia during the past fifteen months.



## I. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

The history of the first beginnings of the social-democratic movement in Russia has yet to be written. Until the March revolution of 1917 the strictness of the Russian censorship and the close surveillance of all socialistic agitation by the secret police made it difficult and even dangerous for the impartial foreign observer to carry out any serious investigations, and the most instructive literature on the subject was subterranean and unavailable to the general public. Although the doctrine of Marx had permeated Russian intellectual circles many years before, it was not until 1898 that any serious attempt was made to form an all-Russian Social-Democratic Party. In 1898, however, the various Social-Democratic groups, which were already in existence, met at Minsk and formed there a single party to be known in future as the "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party." Although the Central Committee, chosen at this Congress, was soon arrested, the party made great progress during the next five years, and the number of branches throughout Russia increased with striking rapidity; so much so, in fact, that even before the revolution every working-man's vote in Russia



was cast for Socialism — a thing which cannot be said of this country. The second Congress of the party took place in July and August of 1903, first at Brussels and later at London. The task of this Congress, which was largely attended, was to fix the rules and statutes of the party organisation and to work out a political programme, formulating as its chief demands the creation of a Democratic Republic and the summoning of a Constituent Assembly. The proceedings, however, were somewhat stormy and revealed at once a deep and radical difference of opinion on questions of party organisation. One party, headed by Lenin, demanded a more thorough centralisation of power in the hands of the Executive Committee, a rigorous suppression of all independent activities, and a severer code of rules for membership of the party. The other group, led by Martoff, defended the democratic principle of organisation and desired a further development of independence on the part of the local organisations. Further differences of opinion existed regarding the policy to be adopted in the event of a successful revolution. The supporters of the Martoff group were prepared to concede to the Liberal bourgeoisie at any rate a temporary justification of their existence, but Lenin maintained that the overthrow of Tsardom by the aid of

the bourgeoisie and the establishment of a democratic republic would not only weaken the domination of the capitalists but would actually increase it. These differences of opinion led to a definite breach and, as at this particular Congress the majority or "bolshinstvo" of the delegates voted with Lenin, they were known subsequently as the "bolsheviki," while the minority or "men-shinstvo" were labelled "mensheviki." This is the real origin of the Bolsheviks, and, although the word "Bolshevism," which has been created to describe the doctrine of the Bolsheviks, has an entirely different signification, "Bolshevik" in its original sense has no further meaning than that which has just been explained. To state that "Bolshevism" means "the rule of the majority" is simply absurd and shows a complete ignorance both of the character of Bolshevism and of the Russian language.

During the revolution of 1905 further attempts were made to bring the two parties together. These attempts, however, met with only a very temporary success, and to-day the two parties stand in a violent opposition, which has been rendered still more bitter by the ruthless suppression of the Menshevik Press and the expulsion of the Menshevik leaders from the Soviets.

Since 1905 the Bolsheviks have travelled far

in their revolutionary journey to the extreme left. In the words of one of their own leaders, the difference between a Bolshevik and a Menshevik lies in the fact that the one has the courage of his convictions and the other has not. A truer definition would be that the Menshevik is guided by democratic principles and upholds the free expression of the human will, while to the Bolshevik democracy is only a capitalist "shibboleth" and is in reality a bar to all social progress. At any rate the Bolshevik of to-day has erased the word democracy from his party's title, and his policy may be justly described as the immediate establishment of communism by violent methods. Whilst the Menshevik shrinks before the appalling tragedy of civil war, the Bolshevik stands for the merciless destruction of the bourgeoisie by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for the international Bolshevik revolution.

This difference between the Bolsheviks and other Socialists is accurately described by Bucharin, one of the leading Bolsheviks, in his book *The Programme of the Bolshevik Communists* (Moscow, 1918).

Our party (he writes), until the last Congress, was called the Social-Democratic Party. Throughout the world all parties of the working-classes bore this name.



The war, however, has created an unprecedented split in the ranks of the social-democratic parties, and here we now find three distinct tendencies — an extreme right, a centre, and an extreme left. The right social-democrats are real traitors to the working-classes. They lick the boots of generals stained with working-men's blood. Of these "gentlemen" there is a large number in France and England. . . . The second tendency is the centre. This group agitates against its governments, but is incapable of carrying on a revolutionary struggle. It cannot make up its mind to call the workmen into the streets. It fears like fire the armed struggle which alone can decide the question. Finally, there is the third tendency — that of the extreme left. In Germany this group is represented by Liebknecht and his friends. These are the foreign Bolsheviks. Their tactics, their views, are our tactics and our views.

In Russia, when in October the revolutionary struggle and the development of the revolution set at stake the establishment of socialism and the overthrow of bourgeois power, the struggle between the socialist-traitors and the supporters of socialism had to be decided by force of arms. The right social revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were on one side of the barricades with all the counter-revolutionary swine; the Bolsheviks were on the other side with the workmen and soldiers. Blood has created a gulf between us. This is not forgotten and never will be forgotten. That is why we have had to give our party another name in order to distinguish us from these traitors of socialism. Too great is the distance that separates us. Too different are our paths and theirs.

This is typical Bolshevik propaganda and furnishes an excellent example of the Bolshevik method of uncompromising attack on all those who do not share their views. There is only one socialism — Bolshevik socialism — and all other forms of socialism are merely a betrayal of the working-class. This can be amplified by countless quotations from the speeches and articles of Lenin, in which he turns and reviles those who were once his colleagues: Plechanoff, Axelrode, Martoff, Kautsky, Guesde, Trotsky before his conversion, and many others too numerous to mention. To the Bolshevik as to the Muhammedan the world is divided into the faithful and the infidel, and by the Bolshevik, reactionaries, Liberals, democrats, social-revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and even extreme Socialists of a different revolutionary character are classified under the one heading of "counter-revolutionary."

## II. BOLSHEVIK LEADERS

A well-known French psychologist has thus defined the part of the people in revolutionary struggles: "The part of the people has been the same in all revolutions. It is never the people that conceives them or directs them. Its activity is released by means of leaders." This is es-

pecially true of a country like Russia, where nearly eighty per cent. of the population is totally illiterate, and no review of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia can be attempted without some reference to the character and psychology of the men who have inspired and carried through that revolution. It must be frankly admitted that these leaders, however fanatical they may be, are perfectly genuine and sincere in their beliefs. Many of them have suffered years of exile and imprisonment. Some have already perished for their convictions. A few again are men who were born to riches but who have abandoned all hope of personal fortune in the interests of their cause. And to-day, at all events, they have all burned their boats and know well the fate that awaits them in the event of their overthrow. They have shown no mercy. They neither expect it nor claim it for themselves.

As men many of the leaders belong undoubtedly to that class of professional rebel whose mind has been contorted and perverted by personal suffering and by the difficulties that have beset his own existence. Men of this kind have no country, have never had any country, and are genuinely international in their outlook. Although it would be unfair to state that such men are influenced by the feeling of revenge, their



minds are swayed, perhaps subconsciously, by the thought that the revolution has now given them the opportunity of getting their own back on a world in which they have suffered greatly. It is only natural that in a country like the pre-revolutionary Russia a large percentage of such men should be found among the Jewish population, and there is no doubt that Jews to a very large extent control and provide the working machinery of the Bolshevik party. Of the twelve leading Bolshevik commissars eight are Jews, and there is a certain significance in the fact that they have seen fit to retain even to-day the Russian pseudonyms which they had formerly adopted as a measure of protection from the police. Amongst the smaller officials of the Bolshevik commissariats the percentage of Jews is probably even higher. To avoid any misinterpretation it should be pointed out that there is also a high percentage of Jews both in the Menshevik and social-revolutionary parties and also in the Cadet party, while it is interesting to note that the assassination of Count Mirbach and the Bolshevik commissar Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin's life were in each instance carried out by anti-Bolshevik Jewish Socialists.

Although in its inception the Bolshevik movement was a purely intellectual movement, which

even to-day is still entirely controlled by men of the upper and lower middle-classes who have never worked with their hands, there is another type of Bolshevik supporter which is to be found amongst that section of the rank and file of the proletariat which is genuinely Bolshevik in its sympathies. This is the educated or semi-educated workman who in Russia has been educated secretly by the Bolsheviks and who, never having known any other form of education, believes whole-heartedly in the every letter of his Leninised Marxism in much the same way as an uneducated Muhammedan accepts the every letter of the Koran. To men of this type, and, indeed, to many of the intellectual leaders, Bolshevism is a belief, akin to a religious belief, which has nothing in common with rational logic and which is accepted without discussion. It is only when we admit the irrational character of this belief that we can arrive at an understanding of the terror and of the numerous outrages committed by the Bolsheviks in the name of socialism.

Another type of Bolshevik supporter is the mystical Socialist who has no very firm party convictions. These men accept Bolshevism more for its ideals than for its methods, but chiefly, perhaps, because it is the line of least resistance and because the Bolsheviks have been the victorious

party. Such men are not devoid of humane feelings. They are probably opposed in principle to all acts of terror, but through the weakness of their own character their individuality is entirely submerged when it comes into contact with the powerful environment of their more daring colleagues. Their votes are cast with the majority, and for the acts of that majority they must share full responsibility.

Much has been written in the foreign Press of the criminal elements in the Bolshevik movement. Few honest observers will deny that there has been very considerable exaggeration in this connection, and it should be admitted that most, if not all, of the genuine leaders are entirely free from the taint of corruption. All civilised societies, however, possess to a larger or smaller degree a residue of degenerates and criminals, and in this respect Russia was assuredly in no better position than any of her Western neighbours. The Bolshevik revolution gave to this class an unrivalled opportunity of satisfying its lowest instincts, and many detestable and thoroughly worthless elements have undoubtedly wormed their way into minor but nevertheless powerful posts under Bolshevik employment. The Bolsheviks themselves admit this, and one has only to study the files of the Bolshevik Press



to see how frequent are the cases of theft and robbery on the part of minor Soviet officials. In an uneducated country like Russia, where corruption has always been rife, the Bolshevik efforts to cleanse their administration have been attended by only partial success, and even to-day there is little in the shape of false passports, Bolshevik documents, provisions, grain, eggs, butter, in a word, of anything over which the Bolshevik employees have control, even life and death, which cannot be bought for a price.

When all is said and done, however, the Bolshevik party remains to a large extent a one-man party. That one man is Lenin. Whatever his faults may be, few who have been brought into contact with him will deny that he is in many respects a remarkable man. Some day he may possibly rank as a great man, and his place in history will assuredly be as provocative of discussion and of violent controversy as that of the Jacobins of the French revolution. His claim to greatness is not to be based on the success of his revolution in Russia nor yet on his powers as a mob-orator. There have been greater demagogues than Lenin. History, too, knows many examples of men who have been able to enjoy temporary power by means of extravagant promises of universal prosperity and by playing on

the instincts of passion and hatred. Lenin has all the attributes necessary to the demagogue, has made use of all the demagogue's arts, but his dominating influence in the Bolshevik party is due to other qualities. Quite apart from his very considerable intellectual powers, his chief asset as a leader is his undoubted courage — his almost fanatical confidence in his own judgment. Older than most of his colleagues, who are nearly all well under forty, he is at once the dictator and the professor of the whole movement. His appearances in public are comparatively rare, but from his shelter in the Kremlin he controls and guides each department of his government in a manner, which, while never actually suggesting the presence of a dictator, is rarely challenged. Alone of all the Bolshevik leaders he enjoys to a remarkable degree the respect of his colleagues, and it is his influence alone which has kept the party together and put a check on the mutual jealousies and rivalries that are so common in all Russian parties.

His chief claim to greatness, however, lies in the fact that he foresaw sooner and more clearly than anyone else that pathological state of unrest and discontent into which the whole world was to be plunged as the result of four years of unprecedented warfare. From the first day of the

outbreak of hostilities he realised the reaction which the war was bound to produce, and he began at once to prepare his machinery for exploiting that reaction in the interests of his own aims. The Russian revolution of March, 1917, gave him his chance. He was not influenced in any way by national sentiments. National warfare was merely an instrument to be exploited in the interests of the great class war which was and always has been his ultimate aim. To attain that goal any means were justifiable, and, if the Germans were foolish enough to send him back to Russia through Germany, to a man of Lenin's point of view there was nothing dishonourable in the acceptance of such an offer. Capital was the root of all evils, and all capitalist governments were alike. Where there was a capitalist domination, for the genuine Socialist there could be no such thing as patriotism. Therefore, those Socialists, not only in Germany, but also in the Entente countries, who supported the war in the name of self-defence, were traitors to Socialism and agents of the capitalist Imperialists. He realised from the first that his whole existence was based on his power to give Russia peace and on his ability to consolidate his position until he could turn, as he himself has always said, "the Imperialist war into a civil war." As long as



the Allies and Germany were engaged in killing one another — in fact, if only the war would last long enough until the peoples of Europe were thoroughly tired of war, he felt that he had everything to gain and that, no matter how humiliating the terms might be, peace with Germany was essential to the triumph of his cause. Time, he felt, was on his side, and he gambled on general exhaustion and on an inconclusive and indefinite result to the war. In order to achieve his peace he had to destroy in the minds of the Russian people any sentimental prejudice in favour of the Allies. His bitter agitation against the Entente during the Kerensky regime was conducted far more from this point of view than from any subsidised subservience to the desires of the Imperial German Government.

Some people in this country are under the impression that the Bolsheviks genuinely desired universal peace. This is another "shibboleth" which shows how faulty has been our interpretation of the Bolshevik ideal. The Bolshevik offer of universal peace was a mere pretence which they knew and calculated would be refused. If there be any who are still in doubt upon this point, they may be referred to the preface of Lenin and Zinovieff's *Against the Current*, from which

the  
in 1959  
visit to  
A. D.

the following quotation gives the direct answer to this question:

In the discussions (at Zimmerwald in 1915) regarding the question — what would the Proletariat Party do if a revolution were to put it in power during the present war? — we (i. e., Lenin and Zinovieff) replied: “we would offer peace to all the combatants on the basis of the liberation of the colonies and of all dependent, down-trodden and subject races. Neither Germany nor France nor England would accept these terms under their present governments. We would then prepare (after a separate peace with Germany, of course) to carry out in full by the most decisive measures our minimum programme, and also systematically to stir up revolt amongst all the peoples at present oppressed by the great Russians, amongst the colonies and dependent countries of Asia, India, China, Persia, etc., and also, above all, to call to arms the Socialist proletariat of Europe against their Governments and in spite of their chauvinist Socialists. There is no doubt that the victory of the proletariat in Russia would create exceptionally favourable conditions for the development of revolution both in Asia and in Europe.”

The continuation of the war between Germany and the Allies was essential to the success of the Bolshevik experiment in Russia. This has been admitted on more than one occasion by different Bolshevik leaders, and the “credit” for Russia’s separate peace is due entirely to Lenin. In Febru-

ary of 1918, when many of the Bolsheviks, including Trotsky, seemed inclined to accept a war with Germany, which to them seemed unavoidable, and which, since they had destroyed the army, could not have failed to destroy them, Lenin stood steadfast for peace even if it meant the loss of the richest parts of Russia. And from the Bolshevik point of view Lenin was undoubtedly right.

It is important to realise this all-powerful domination of Lenin. Trotsky, who until the revolution hovered with a small party of his own mid-way between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, possesses neither the same self-confidence nor the same fixity of purpose as his more far-seeing colleague, and too much importance should not be attributed to the frequent rumours of quarrels between the two men. Trotsky's genius lies rather in his enormous capacity for work and in his love of action. Lenin, however, is the Bolshevik law-giver, the framer of the Bolshevik decrees, and the author of the Bolshevik Constitution. If, then, we wish to understand the fundamental aims and ideals which underlie Bolshevik policy, it is on the writings of Lenin rather than to the propaganda work of Radek and Trotsky that we should rivet our attention.



## III. BOLSHEVIK ASPIRATIONS

Although the Bolsheviks came into power solely on account of their peace programme, the wreck of the great army which supported them knew little of its new masters beyond the fact that the latter had promised a famished and war-weary country the millennium: land, bread, and peace. It is not the intention of this article, nor indeed does space permit, to describe even in outline the various crises through which the Bolshevik government has passed during its fifteen months' existence. Put very briefly, the Bolshevik reign may be divided into two periods: first, the anarchic period from November, 1917, to April, 1918, during which the Bolsheviks, by fanning the flame of class-hatred and by pandering to the popular favour of the mob and of the returning army, were engaged in creating the necessary force for the maintenance of their own existence and for the consolidation of their own position; and, secondly, the period from May, 1918, up to the present moment during which the Bolsheviks have attempted by violent methods to force their social reforms upon a population a large proportion of which is unwilling to accept them. During all this time civil war has raged all over Russia

with an ebb and flow of violence which to-day shows no signs of abating.

In these pages, however, we are concerned solely with an examination of the real aims and aspirations of the Bolsheviks. In this connexion it is of paramount importance for the foreign student of Bolshevism to realise from the first the essential difference between the fundamental policy and the opportunist policy of the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik leaders themselves admit the difference. It explains the many inconsistencies in their policy — inconsistencies which they do not deny and which are in some respects not unnatural. The Bolsheviks are a minority party. They are supported by a proletariat which, although inspired with a genuine revolutionary enthusiasm, is very largely illiterate; in fact, by elements which Lenin himself has occasionally characterised as unsatisfactory and which do not always understand the ideas of their leaders. In order to maintain their position, the Bolsheviks have therefore been forced into frequent inconsistencies both in their foreign and in their internal policy. As one of the leaders of the French revolution wrote, many of the decisions which they have been forced to take "were more often than otherwise not intended or desired by them two days or even one day beforehand: the

crisis alone evoked them." They have "beaten both to the left and to the right." In one part of the country they have appealed to national sentiments; in another part they have denounced them with all the fervour of extreme internationalism. At every meeting they preach the gospel of civil war and of no compromise with capitalism, and at the same time their wireless is flying kites in the foreign Press regarding the gradual moderation of their views and their desire for peace with the Entente.

In his fundamental aims and aspirations, however, Lenin is and always has been thoroughly consistent. His one aim is the establishment of communism throughout Europe by means of the international Bolshevik revolution. It is necessary to lay stress on the "throughout Europe," because Lenin himself has admitted that a communist Russia cannot exist alongside a capitalist Europe. As late as December 10, 1918, we find him saying in a speech to the Congress of Poverty Committees: "Our chief hope, our chief support, is in the proletariat of Western Europe, in the proletariat of the more advanced countries." No compromise with the bourgeoisie has been the chief tenet of Lenin's political beliefs throughout his whole life, and paragraph 3 of the Soviet Constitution defines "the victory of Socialism in



all countries" as one of the chief aims of the Soviet Republic. There is nothing to show that any Bolshevik statements to the contrary can be regarded in the light of anything except a temporary expedient dictated by the needs of the moment or by the weakness of their own position and violable as soon as circumstances permit.

In Bolshevik socialism itself there is little that is new. "We have returned," writes Bucharin, "to the old name of the revolutionary party, at the head of which stood Karl Marx. That was the Communist Party. And the evangel of the present revolution is still the one which was written by Marx and Engels." The Bolsheviks are the only true exponents of Marxism. Kautsky, Hyndman, Plechanoff, and all non-Bolshevik Marxians have betrayed Marx. Scheidemann and the German Majority Socialists are, like the British Labour Party, anathema. "When the German workers conquer, they will do well to hang Scheidemann on the same gallows as Wilhelm." [The whole phraseology of Bolshevism is borrowed straight from Marx, and the ultimate goal is the communist State, "which will destroy all forms of government, including democratic government."]

What is interesting in the Bolshevik experiment is the machine which Lenin has created for the

establishment of his communist State. This machine is based on the famous "dictatorship of the proletariat," which is explained by Lenin in his *State and Revolution* as follows: Throughout history every form of government has been purely a weapon in the hands of the possessing class for controlling the dispossessed classes. After the victory of the latter they, too, must have such a weapon until all forms of opposition have been destroyed. In the case of the dictatorship of the proletariat this weapon is to be regarded as a transition stage until communism is finally established:

To communism, through the dictatorship of the proletariat — that is our party cry. Dictatorship means an iron power, a power which will not spare its enemies. The dictatorship of the working classes is a State power of the working-classes which will strangle the bourgeoisie and the land-owners. . . . That means that you communists stand for the employment of forcible oppression? Of course, we reply, we stand for the employment of revolutionary force. . . . Along the path of compromise, which the Mensheviks and social-revolutionaries advocate, you will find nothing good. (Bucharin.)

In the future communist organisation of society all private property will be abolished. All wealth will belong to society as a whole, and not to individual classes or individual persons. All

government will be suppressed except, apparently, "a central statistical bureau,"

which will decide how many boots, trousers, sausages, how much blacking, wheat, cloth, etc., shall be produced in a year; it will further decide how many comrades must work in the fields, in the sausage factories, in the tailors' workshops. In a corresponding manner all labour will be distributed. All production will be carried out on a strictly calculated plan, based on the number of machines and agricultural implements, the amount of raw material and the supply of labour. (Bucharin.)

Many people have been attracted by the ideals of communism, but even the most biassed enthusiast can foresee the chaos which must inevitably prevail when in an ignorant and illiterate country an attempt is made to introduce communism within twenty-four hours by a single decree and to establish it by methods of violence. This attempt the Bolsheviks have made. Not only have they nationalised the banks, the factories and the land, but they have also nationalised all private property, including shops, small holdings, and even books. Civil war rages in consequence over the whole country, and the Bolsheviks are still mainly occupied by their endeavours to muzzle and effectively to suppress their opponents.



## IV. THE BOLSHEVIK MACHINE

Without entering into any complicated discussion of the various stages of the civil war, let us examine the political machine which the Bolsheviks have created for the suppression of their adversaries. Since the Bolsheviks came into power as a minority party, their government is naturally built with a careful regard for this political inconvenience. Indeed, it might be pointed out quite truthfully that Russia has always been ruled by a minority, and in a country like Russia, which possesses few large cities, a small bourgeoisie, a small proletariat, and an enormous disorganised and almost totally illiterate peasantry, the power of a vigorous minority which controls the industrial capitals is not easily challenged. The Bolsheviks are opposed by all the intellectual classes, by all the other Socialist parties, including Anarchists like Prince Kropotkin, and by a considerable majority of the peasantry. They were at one time supported by the bulk of the proletariat of Petrograd and Moscow and by that section of the peasantry which they call the "peasant poor," and which is to a considerable extent composed of workmen who have been sent back to the villages in consequence of the stop-

page of the factories. But their tyranny and maladministration have gradually produced a great revulsion of feeling.

The Bolshevik political machine is built exclusively on these elements, and more especially on the urban proletariat. The following excerpts from the official "Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic," of July 19th, 1918, show very clearly the character of the safeguards which the Bolsheviks have created in order to secure a Bolshevik majority and to exclude all possibility of political opposition:

The all-Russian Congress of Soviets is the supreme power of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. (Paragraph 24.)

The all-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of representatives of the town Soviets in the ratio of one delegate for every 25,000 voters and of representatives of the government (or county) Soviets in the ratio of one delegate for every 125,000 voters. (Para. 25.)

(This paragraph guarantees the predominating influence of the urban proletariat.)

The all-Russian Congress of Soviets must be summoned by the all-Russian Executive Committee not less than twice a year. (Para. 26.)

(The Congress meets in practice about once every three months. Its sittings last from two to three days.)

The all-Russian Congress of Soviets chooses the all-Russian Executive Committee to the number of not more than 200 delegates. (Para. 28.)

The Central Executive Committee is responsible in every way to the Congress of Soviets. During the interval between the Congresses the Central Executive Committee is the supreme authority of the Republic. (Paras. 29 and 30.)

The Central Executive Committee is the legislative, administrative and controlling organ of the R.S.F.S.R. (Para. 31.)

The Central Executive Committee forms the Council of People's Commissars for the general administration of the affairs of the R.S.F.R.S. (Para. 35.)

The Council of Commissars is responsible to the Central Executive Committee, who can control or cancel all its actions.

Paragraph 64 gives the rules governing the elections to the Soviets. Both sexes over the age of eighteen may vote if they belong to one of the following categories: (a) All those engaged in producing the necessary means of life, and also those engaged in household work for the maintenance of the above-mentioned toilers of production — that is, workmen and servants of all classes engaged in industry and agriculture, peasants and cossacks, who do not employ hired labour. (b) Soldiers and sailors of the Soviet army and navy. (c) Citizens mentioned in (a) and (b) who have lost their power of working.

Then follows a significant amendment under the heading of Note No. I.

Local Soviets may, with the approval of the Central authority, *lower* the age limit fixed in the present statute.

Paragraph 65 gives the list of those who may *not* vote, even if they belong to the categories mentioned in Para-



graph 64: (a) All people employing hired labour for the sake of profit. (b) All those who live on profits not made by their own labour — *i. e.*, people living on interest from capital, income from industrial enterprises or from property. (c) Private traders, trade and commercial agents. (d) Monks and religious employees of the Church. (e) Servants and agents of the ancient police and likewise all members of the Imperial Russian family.

The real safeguard of the Soviet Constitution, however, is to be found in paragraph 23, which runs as follows:

*" Guided by the interests of the working-class as a whole the R.S.F.R.S. deprives certain individuals and certain groups of their rights, which are used by them contrary to the interests of the Socialist Republic."*

This statute is aimed at the anti-Bolshevik Socialists, and has been applied with the usual Bolshevik rigour.

That a system founded on this principle should be cruel is inevitable. The peace of Brest-Litovsk has been bought at the price of civil war, and the Bolsheviks, who at one time posed as the champions of anti-militarism, at once proceeded to adopt themselves a system of military despotism based on force and on conscription. The attempt to obtain a volunteer army amongst the working classes failed lamentably, and the Red Army of to-day is a conscript army composed partly of foreign troops, Letts, Hungarians, and Chinese, partly of nondescripts of all classes and of no particular political colour, who accept

service in the army because it is the easiest, and for some the only, means of procuring food and clothing and the other necessities of life. On the whole, however, the pick of the Red Army is to be found in the regiments composed of the young workmen conscripts from Petrograd and Moscow, who were at one time inspired by a genuine revolutionary enthusiasm; but even their loyalty has been shaken by the ruthless suppression of all personal liberty. The fighting qualities of the Red Army are very uncertain, but there can be no doubt that during the early months of this year a marked advance has been made both in the way of discipline and of military efficiency.

Another instrument of the Bolshevik machine is the censorship, which is applied with a severity which far outrivals the worst repressions of the old regime. Indeed, in spite of a different nomenclature, there is a close resemblance between the present-day methods of the Bolsheviks and the worst periods of Russian reaction. The anti-Bolshevik Press, and in particular the anti-Bolshevik Socialist Press, has been hounded out of existence. The right of free speech and of public meeting, so clamorously upheld by the Bolsheviks during the Kerensky regime, have been violently suppressed, while a careless word of criticism

against a Soviet Government may lead to proscription, incarceration, and even death. The death-sentence against which the Bolsheviks once thundered has been restored, and thousands of people have been put to death without even the mockery of a trial. All forms of justice have been suspended, and in their place reign the Extraordinary Commissions. These Commissions are an exaggerated and more powerful imitation of the old Russian Secret Police. They have uncontrolled powers over life and death and, again in imitation of the old Russian gendarmerie, they possess their own corps of troops. These commissions were appointed to deal with counter-revolution and speculation, and are undoubtedly the most powerful instrument in the hands of the Bolsheviks for the suppression of all forms of opposition and of anti-Bolshevik propaganda. It is true that by the severity of their methods they have succeeded in establishing a semblance of order in Petrograd and Moscow, that they have indeed put some check on the unbridled brigandage, murder, and anarchy which were so prevalent during the early months of the Bolshevik regime, but they are chiefly to be considered as a political force, and in this respect their record is comparable only to that of the Jacobins. They



are in fact the instrument of the Terror, and the ferocity or mildness of its application in a particular town or district depends almost entirely on the whims and fancies of the President of the local Commission.

While the rule of the Bolsheviks in the big towns of Northern and Central Russia has been more or less firmly established, their control over the country districts is more uncertain. The peasant, who in those districts which have not been ravaged by the war has thriven materially during the war, welcomed the Bolshevik invitation to seize the land which for years has been denied to him. While he undoubtedly fears the return of any order which will again deprive him of his land, he resents very strongly the communist decrees which destroy all private property and will hand over his implements, his live-stock, and his stores of grain to the common ownership of society as a whole. He has, perhaps, very rudimentary ideas of economic values, but he has a natural suspicion of the inferior paper money which the Bolsheviks are issuing in such wild profusion. He is sadly in need of cotton goods, agricultural implements, and boots. In exchange for these commodities he might be willing to sell his grain, but he not unnaturally refuses to sell

it at the low price fixed by the Bolsheviks in exchange, not for goods, but for money which he realises has no value.

▼ This has produced a deadlock which in view of the famine in the big towns has had to be overcome. Like all Bolshevik remedies, the solution of this problem has been found in force. In order to create a class-feeling of hatred the Bolsheviks have divided the peasants into two divisions of rich and poor. Under the latter heading are included all who have not sufficient grain for themselves. These are then formed into Poverty Committees with the nominal task of administering the rural affairs of Russia in the interests of the proletarian peasants. In practice they assist the armed bands of Red Guards who are sent down into the villages to seize by force the grain from the peasants. These raids are resisted by the peasants to the best of their ability and are almost invariably accompanied by bloodshed. The foreign Press, which has been full of the undeniable sufferings of the bourgeoisie, has heard little of the series of bloodily suppressed peasant revolts which have taken place in many parts of Soviet Russia since last summer. It was this question of the Poverty Committees which caused the real rupture between the Bolsheviks and the left Socialist-revolutionaries, a

party in itself quite as extreme as the Bolsheviks. Spiridonova, their leader (since imprisoned), roundly accused Lenin of exploiting the peasants in the interests of the urban proletariat and called upon the former to resist both the committees and the armed provision raids. How difficult is the peasant problem for the Bolsheviks may be seen from one of Lenin's December speeches. This speech, while justifying the creation of the Poverty Committees, is full of significant admissions which may lead to a temporary change in Bolshevik agrarian policy. "There is no doubt," he says, "that in a peasant country like Russia the establishment of Socialism is a very difficult task. There is no doubt that to wipe out an enemy like Tsarism, like the big land-owners, was comparatively easy. In the centres it was possible to decide this question in a few days, throughout the whole country in a few weeks, but the task upon which we are now engaged can only be accomplished by an extremely long and desperate struggle. It is clear that such a reform as the transformation of small peasant-proprietor units into a general scheme of land socialisation demands much time, can in fact by no means be carried out at once."

Further measures for suppressing all political opponents and for starving them into submission



are to be found in the division of the population into four categories for the purpose of food distribution and in the decree enforcing forced labour for the bourgeoisie. In view of the nationalisation of everything, it is obvious that one can only labour in a Bolshevik-controlled organisation. This is the real explanation of the statement that "the great mass of the professional and petty bourgeoisie have gone over to the Bolsheviks during the autumn." \*

The suppression by the Bolsheviks of their political opponents, however, is only one of their main activities and has to be supplemented by constructive measures for the furtherance of their own programme and for the winning over of fresh supporters. In this connexion Lenin's attention, as one might naturally expect, is directed almost exclusively to the young workman and the young peasant. By a systematic suppression of all anti-Bolshevik intellectual forces in the country he has taken great pains to prevent the young urban and rural proletarians from any contamination by bourgeois and "false" socialist education. One of his decrees provides for the free education of the working-classes and, although it has naturally not been possible to give immediate effect to this reform, a vigorous commencement has been made

\* *New Statesman*, December 21, 1918.

for the spread of Bolshevik education amongst the masses. A Socialist Academy has been established in Moscow. This is in reality nothing but a school for agitators, and in general considerable pains are taken to discover likely youths amongst the peasants and workmen. These youths are maintained free in the capitals, carefully trained in Bolshevik dialectics, and then sent back to the factory and to the village to spread the cult amongst their more ignorant brethren. Meanwhile all real education has completely broken down.

High wages are naturally a part of the system, but, in view of the fantastic prices which prevail, the dearth of food and goods of all kinds, the break-down of production, and the almost complete cessation of the value of paper money, the worker is in reality worse off than in pre-revolution days. Nevertheless, it must be taken for granted that amid the appalling suffering which is everywhere felt in Russia to-day the proletariat has more privileges than a member of any other class. He is lodged in the houses of the bourgeoisie. Communal kitchens have been established for his benefit, and of such food as is available he secures the chief share. Various schemes have been adopted for his amusement, and in addition to cheap theatrical entertainments,

cheap literature, all, however, on strictly class lines, has been issued to him in great profusion. At the same time, in the attempt to restore some order out of the industrial chaos which prevails, carefully-disguised but nevertheless firm measures are being taken to put some restraint on his hitherto unlimited liberty of action and to make him submit to the single and undivided will of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

In this connexion the power and influence of Bolshevik propaganda as an effective instrument of the Bolshevik machine must not be underestimated. It is indeed one of the chief forces of Bolshevism. No one who has had any contact with Bolshevism will deny the power of its emotional appeal, especially to an ignorant and oppressed proletariat whose lives have been spent in the soulless drudgery of the factory and the workshop. The revolution in Russia has awakened in the souls of thousands of these people a consciousness of their own power and of their own rights. It has created in them a spirit of blind revolt against the old order without, however, teaching them any sense of their own responsibilities. It is by continually harping on the wrongs which the working-classes have suffered and by holding out extravagant promises of a won-



derful future that the Bolsheviks have maintained a hold on their affections.

## V. BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA

Bolshevik propaganda may be divided into two distinct sections: foreign propaganda and internal propaganda. Very careful attention is paid to both, but there is a marked difference in the literary fare that is provided for foreign consumption and for home consumption. The foreign propaganda is naturally addressed to those elements in other countries whom the Bolsheviks hope to convert to an imitation of their example. It is a diplomatic weapon, and, as in all diplomacy, it is used not so much for the statement of its own case as for an exposure of its opponent's weakness. As their ranks are full of men who have an extensive knowledge of the different capitals of Europe, the Bolshevik Foreign Office has an infinitely better knowledge of labour conditions in foreign countries than any other Foreign Office, and it knows exactly what material will produce the desired effect in each particular country and to what particular section of the community that appeal must be addressed. Just as the anti-Bolshevik Press dwells on the horrors of the Red

Terror, so, too, the Bolshevik foreign propaganda is full of lurid details of the atrocities of the Whites. Pathetic pictures are drawn of a free Socialist Government of the highest principles being crushed out of existence by the combined efforts of the capitalist Governments of Europe, and every effort is made to convey the impression that the Bolsheviks are fighting the battle of Progress against Tsardom, as though there were no choice in Russia except between Bolshevism and reaction.

Great attention is paid to the colonial policy of the capitalist Governments, and no pains are spared to appeal to the national aspirations of India, Egypt, Persia, and Ireland. Even China is not neglected, and on the propaganda staff of the Bolshevik Foreign Office are men and women of almost every race and colour.

The propaganda for home consumption is naturally of a simpler character. It is directed, first and foremost, against capital and the capitalist Governments of the world; secondly, against parliamentarism and the futility of constitutional methods; and, thirdly, against the Mensheviks, right social-revolutionaries and anti-Bolshevik Socialists, whom the Bolsheviks have up to now regarded as their most dangerous opponents. The working-classes are taught not only that capi-

tal is an evil thing in itself, but also that capital can only be destroyed by force and that until it is so destroyed there can be no improvement of the workers' lot. Particular attention is concentrated upon England and America, which as strongholds of democracy are regarded as the least fruitful ground for a Bolshevik revolution, but which nevertheless are described as tottering to their fall. Long articles appear almost daily in the official Press regarding the labour situation in the chief allied countries. The British Labour Party is described as "worse than the right S.R.'s," while great pains are taken to illustrate the diminishing power of the official Labour leaders and the rapid growth of the English Bolshevik movement amongst the rank and file. The army is told, and believes, that it has conquered Germany and is now fighting the rest of the world and is fighting a winning battle. Genuinely imbued with new ideals and new theories, the Bolshevik leaders are waging a bitter struggle against all the economic and social laws which have hitherto governed mankind. As their theories come into contact with the hard facts of life and the weakness of human nature, the economic obstacles in their path become more and more insurmountable. Frenzied enthusiasm turns to exasperated desperation and desperation to vio-



lence, until world revolution becomes the only panacea for the economic chaos which their regime has created. This is especially true of their financial policy. They have no revenue beyond the output of the printing-machine and confiscations from the bourgeoisie. The latter source of income is already exhausted. Money has lost its value, and even anxious Bolshevik critics wish to know where it will all end. And the reply is always the same: Have patience but a little longer. Your day is coming. When the international revolution is an accomplished fact, when communism is finally established, money will no longer be required. In the meantime, as funds of some sort are necessary, any means of raising them are justifiable. "The following, for instance, is an excellent and justifiable measure: The Government should declare that by a certain date all money must be changed for new money and that the old money has lost its value. This means that everyone must dig out his savings and bring them to the banks. Then we can carry out a plan like this. Don't touch the savings of the poorer people; give rouble for rouble. Above a certain sum retain a part for government needs. For instance, up to five thousand roubles, give rouble for rouble, from the next five thousand take a tenth part, from the

third five thousand a fifth part, and above a certain sum confiscate all." (Bucharin.) It is difficult to reconcile arguments of this kind with the Bolshevik offer of commercial concessions to the Allies. Here again, however, it is necessary to distinguish between fundamentals and opportunist expedients.

More rational perhaps, and therefore more dangerous, are the Bolshevik arguments against parliamentarism and constitutional methods. It will be remembered that at one time there was no one so eager as the Bolsheviks for the immediate summoning of the Constituent Assembly. Their action in forcibly dissolving that assembly when it had furnished an anti-Bolshevik majority was subjected to much criticism, even on the part of the proletariat, who could not understand so sudden a *volte face*. The Bolsheviks meet their critics with the following argument:

The difference between the Constituent Assembly and the Congress of Soviets lies in the fact that in the former not only do the working-classes vote, but also the bourgeoisie and the agents of the bourgeoisie (*i. e.*, the anti-Bolshevik Socialists). In the Soviets the bourgeois, the former landowners, the bankers, the trade-speculators, the merchants, the shopkeepers, the money-lenders, the Korniloff intellectuals, the priests, the bishops, have no vote, no political rights. In the Constituent Assembly may sit

not only workmen and peasants, but also bankers, land-owners and capitalists; not only the communists, not only the left social-revolutionaries, not only even the socialist traitors like the right social revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, but also the Cadets, the Octobrists, and the Black Hundred. The experience of all countries shows that where the bourgeoisie enjoys full rights it always deceives the poor and the working-classes. For instance, in all countries where there is a bourgeois republic (*e. g.*, in France, in Switzerland, and in the United States), in spite of universal suffrage, the supreme power is wholly in the hands of the financiers. Thus it is clear what the right S.R.'s and the Mensheviks are doing when they wish to overthrow the power of the Soviets and to call a Constitutional Assembly. (Bucharin.)

Most interesting of all Bolshevik propaganda, however, are the arguments employed against the socialist-patriots, the "socialist-compromisers," and the socialist-pacifists — *i.e.*, those who are opposed to violent methods. All of these have been the subjects of the most scathing attacks by the various Bolshevik leaders. In this connexion the "union sacrée" in France and England and the International Socialist Bureau have incurred the bitter wrath of the Bolshevik propagandists. Huysmans, Henderson, Albert Thomas, and Renaudel are all agents of the Imperialists. "Who would seriously have thought," writes Lenin, "that in one day such



men as Guesde, Hyndman and Plechanoff would have become Imperialists and betrayed Socialism?" "The so-called Executive Committee of the International Socialist (?) Bureau actually carries out, not the decisions of the International Socialist Congresses, not the mandates of Socialism, but the mandates of the Imperialistic bourgeoisie of the Entente" (Zinovieff). The Independent Labour Party is described as the party "which has never been independent, but has always been dependent on the Liberals" (Lenin). The same party is taken severely to task for stating that "we do not approve of armed revolt just as we disapprove of all forms of militarism and of war." "Need I point out," comments Lenin, "that these anti-militarists are quite the worst kind of opportunists?" The anti-Bolshevik Russian Socialists are denounced as the marionettes of Tsardom and the lackeys of the Entente. In fact, as the Bolsheviks have truly pointed out, the war has divided the Socialists into two groups, the one which favours the establishment of Socialism by constitutional methods, and the other, the Bolshevik group, which denies the whole principle of democracy and which is frankly in favour of violent revolution by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Russian Bolsheviks have declared

that these two groups are irreconcilable, and they have long ago begun a secret agitation for a new International from which the socialist "compromisers" will be excluded. This Socialist split has already made itself felt in every country in Europe and its inevitable development will be marked with still more bitterness. "The enormous majority of the so-called socialists and of the representatives of the old official socialism," writes Lenin in *Against the Current*, "have betrayed the cause of the working-classes. At times it has seemed to us that only a few individuals like Karl Liebknecht, Friedrich Adler, and John Maclean have remained true to the flag of Socialism. The fact remains that 'bourgeois' labour parties as a political force have been formed in all advanced capitalist countries and that without a determined and merciless struggle with these parties or groups there can be no question either of Marxism or of a genuine Socialist labour movement."

## VI. CONCLUSION

The foregoing pages contain, in the writer's belief, a true and accurate description of the real aims and aspirations of the Bolsheviks. No attempt has been made either to analyse the economic results of the Bolshevik experiment or to

give harrowing details of the terrible suffering which famine, disease, and civil war are causing to all classes in Russia. The Bolsheviks themselves plead that it is unfair to judge their experiment while it is still in the transition stage, and declare in extenuation that their work has been hampered by civil war, which has been instigated by the Russian policy of both Germany and the Allies. Whether or not the Bolshevik experiment will ever be successful, can ever be successful, in a country like Russia is a matter for speculation. That it has been hindered by civil war everyone will admit. In this connexion, however, one point must be made clear. Whatever may have been the faults of Allied policy in Russia, it is absurd to hold the Allies responsible for a civil war which, even in the event of the strict neutrality of all Europe, was and is inevitable. Civil war has been preached and is still being preached by all the Bolshevik leaders, and the withdrawal of the scanty forces which the Allies at present hold in Russia will not put an end to civil war. A different Allied policy in Russia before the Bolshevik revolution might possibly have prevented that revolution, but no policy after the event could have modified it except one of force, which the Allies were reluctant to employ. It is a well-known fact that

the Allies are blamed just as much by the anti-Bolshevik Russians for lack of support and for their policy of drift and hesitation. Allied policy during the war was naturally governed by national interests endangered by the war, while Bolshevik policy was only affected by the war in so far as it helped or impeded the class warfare which is the alpha and omega of all Bolshevik policy.

To-day the situation is quite different, and the Russian problem has now to be dealt with purely on its own merits. What Lenin's own views of the future may be it is impossible to say. Possibly he believes in the ultimate triumph of Bolshevism. Perhaps he himself is already conscious of its failure, but hopes by violent agitation in other countries and by driving home still deeper the social revolution in his own country to make a return to the old order of life impossible. He has accepted the Allies' proposal of a conference, against the wishes of Trotsky and a minority of his colleagues; and he is reported to have said to the Moscow Central Soviet, "We must have the courage to confess freely that our Communist plan is going unquestionably to smash if we do not change front." \* But negotiation with the Allies now as with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk

\* *Times*, February 14.



is a question of tactics, not of principles; his willingness to negotiate does not mean that he is any less sincere or resolute in his ultimate aims. No one who has had any contact with the Bolsheviks will deny the genuineness of their fanatical enthusiasm. Many will point out that their excesses are in themselves the inevitable reaction after the excesses and misrule of a preceding tyranny. Many, too, will sympathise instinctively with the convulsive effort of the Russian proletariat to create a better existence for themselves, and there are many lessons in the Russian revolution both for the capitalist and for the socialist.

Out of the existing chaos in Russia, however, one fact stands clear. Bolshevism is a tyranny — a revolutionary tyranny, if you will — which is the complete abnegation of democracy and of all freedom of thought and action. Based on force and terroristic violence, it is simply following out the same philosophy which was preached by Nietzsche and Haeckel, and which for the past twenty-five years has glorified the might of force as the final justification of all existence. By substituting one class domination for another it has merely reversed the former tyranny of the Romanoffs into a tyranny still more terrible and still more cruel in its one-sidedness. At a moment when the whole world is straining forward to-

wards new hopes and new ideals its uncompromising intolerance and its ruthless suppression of all other forms of socialism and democratic progress have narrowed down the socialist movement into a rigid doctrine which is both a weakness from the socialist point of view and a danger to all ideals of freedom. In its present form Bolshevism must either spread or die. It certainly cannot remain stationary. And at the present moment it stands as a very real menace to the peace of Europe and to any successful establishment of a League of Nations.

This is the real problem which the Allied delegates in Paris have now to face. Discussions between the Bolsheviks and the other Russian parties are unlikely to lead to any definite result, are unlikely indeed ever to take place, and the question of a policy for Russia is one that must be faced resolutely and without delay. But whether it be a policy of peace or of war, of neutrality or of intervention, it must be a definite policy. Whatever views one may hold, no one can deny that the present policy of doubt and drift is no policy at all. Not only is it by its obscurity a real danger to the Allied Governments themselves, but it also aggravates and prolongs the agony and suffering of all classes of the unfortunate people of Russia.

## RUSSIA'S REVOLT AGAINST BOLSHEVISM

WE have now set forth in some detail the principles upon which the Soviet Government in Russia is based and the means adopted by it for carrying them into practice. The principles in themselves are nothing new, being based upon an extreme interpretation of the theories of Karl Marx; what is new are the methods adopted for carrying them out. It is the violence and brutality of these methods, which have been cynically enforced quite regardless of the wishes and protests of the population, that have made the Bolshevik regime the object of universal condemnation in the eyes of all sane-thinking people.

Perhaps more than any movement in history Bolshevism in Russia may be described as the movement of one man — Lenin. This is so much the case that Russians have often been heard to declare that Lenin is the only Bolshevik in Russia. Exaggerated as such assertions are, it is at any rate true to say that, but for Lenin with his extraordinary personal and intellectual power, Bol-

shevism would never have taken its present form and would never have held together in the face of opposition both from within and from without. The amount of work he has accomplished during the eighteen months of his rule has been little short of marvellous. Though during the long years of his sojourn abroad he had fully elaborated his theories for the future Socialist State, it was not possible before the Revolution to devise the machinery he would be forced to adopt on the spot. The Soviets themselves, for example, were no part of his original theory. In the Revolution of 1905 he was opposed to the formation of the Soviet, in which Trotsky afterwards played so prominent a part, on the ground that the combination of the whole Labour movement in a single body would retard rather than advance the immediate realisation of complete Socialism. Nevertheless, when he arrived in Russia in April, 1917, and found the Soviets in existence he lost no time in adapting himself to circumstances, and determined that it was through the Soviets and the Soviets alone that he must work, first permeating them with his ideas by skilful propaganda and afterwards by methods of violence making them the faithful instruments of his party. The Soviet system is only tolerated by Lenin in so far as it carries out the decrees



of the Bolshevik Party that dominates the Soviets, and it is idle and fantastic to make any distinction in practice between the Bolshevik Party and the Soviets. In many other ways, too, Lenin has endeavoured to adapt his theories to meet sudden emergencies, provided the main fabric of the structure were left undisturbed. But in spite of his ingenuity and the ability of many of his immediate lieutenants, in spite of the exhaustion of the country after the sufferings of the war, and the difficulty of organising the ignorant masses against the Bolshevik Government once it had planted itself firmly in the saddle, the Bolshevik system is crumbling, and its authors are unable, either by threats or by cajolery, to reinstate it in popular favour or stem the growing resistance of the Russian people themselves to them and all their works.

Recent events in Soviet Russia have already justified the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters. It was clearly stated there that Bolshevism was not likely to succeed for long in a country in such a backward state of development as Russia. Though this very fact might have made its initial success as a destructive force all the easier, yet when it came to constructive effort the failure would be more complete. Lenin himself was aware of this, and was therefore con-

centrating his main effort on maintaining himself in power until he could spread his doctrines into the more advanced countries of Central Europe. His ultimate success would depend on the results achieved in this direction. "In its present form Bolshevism must either spread or die. It certainly cannot remain stationary."

### I. IS BOLSHEVISM ON THE WANE?

So long as the war continued Bolshevism remained to the average man a purely Russian phenomenon. Whatever may have been simmering under the surface in other countries did not catch the eye or impress the world as a whole so long as men were engrossed in all-important military matters. In many countries, it is true, there had been manifestations of sympathy for Lenin and Trotski and for Bolshevism in general as a purely revolutionary force, and there were some who even during the war openly proclaimed themselves Bolsheviks. But no such movement showed any real power until it was clear to the world that the greatest danger had been overcome and that the German military machine had been smashed. Until then Liebknecht, the real leader of the Bolsheviks, had been looked on almost with sympathy by those who, with their attention engaged on

the rights and wrongs of the war, classed him with Bernstein as an enemy of Prussian Militarism without considering what he ultimately stood for. It was the collapse of the old regime in Germany that suddenly opened men's eyes to the existence of a dangerous Bolshevist movement in that country, a movement that stood for the same principles as the Soviet Government in Moscow and advocated the same violent methods for carrying them into effect.

It was not till then that Bolshevism appeared in its true light, not as a Russian, but, as it claimed itself to be, an international movement. The reaction in each country was almost instantaneous. Those who had hitherto failed to grasp the significance of Bolshevism so long as it was isolated in a country so little understood by the general public as Russia rushed to the other extreme and began to denounce the Labour movement in each country as Bolshevik. Some of the speeches made in England by Coalition candidates on the eve of the General Election showed traces of this misunderstanding, and there were few things that did so much good to the Bolshevist cause in that country as the thoughtless way in which the Labour Party was denounced as Bolshevik and some of its most respected leaders, such as Mr. Henderson, branded as "Bolshies."

Since that time, perhaps, the average man has learnt more. The intoxication of victory has passed and it is to be hoped that many of the unwise things said at the General Election have been forgotten. Bolshevism has for some months past engaged the attention of all thinking men and women in a way it never did before; and, in spite of exaggerations and misstatements about the Russia Bolsheviks that inevitably find their way into the press from time to time, the main facts about Bolshevism are now widely known and there is less tendency to label men as Bolsheviks who both by their words and their actions repudiate all connection with the opprobrious epithet. Yet, if there is still a tendency to confuse anti-Bolshevist Socialists with Bolsheviks, the blame rests partly with the former for not having made their attitude sufficiently clear, and, perhaps for this very reason, an analysis of what has taken place in Russia in the ranks of the Socialist parties may help to clarify the situation so far as Bolshevism and Internationalism are concerned.

Outside Russia the leading Bolshevik movements that have come out into the open and signified their formal alliance with Lenin's Government are the Spartacist movement in Germany, the Communist Government in Buda-Pest and the



Italian Official Socialist Party. In other countries, such as France, Holland, Sweden, Norway and even Great Britain, there are small groups that adhere to Bolshevism, but as yet no well-organised party has made its appearance. For the present, therefore, the success of Bolshevism in Europe must be judged by the success of Spartacism in Germany, of Communism in Hungary and in a much less degree of the Official Socialist Party in Italy.

Spartacism in Germany since the German Revolution has had rather a different history from Bolshevism in Russia since the Revolution there. It has shown the same energy and violence as its Bolshevist model, and it has had the example of Lenin to guide it, being able to profit as in Russia by the disastrous economic consequences of the war. On the other hand, it has had several disadvantages that Bolshevism in Russia did not have to contend with. The Russian Bolsheviks were able to stand for immediate peace while their opponents stood for the continuation of the war; the German Spartacists, on the contrary, are the enemies of peace and it is the conclusion of peace with the Western Powers that the German people want. There is again no acute land question in Germany as in Russia, and the Spartacists are not able to make any appeal to the

peasantry that would for the time being bring the majority of the population over to their side. But the most important factor is the strength of the German bourgeoisie and the high percentage of educated people in Germany who see through the theories of the Spartacists and do not believe in their experiments. Thus, in spite of their extraordinary energy, the Spartacists have not met with the rapid success which was necessary for them; any delay tells against them and they know it, and there is no doubt that from their point of view they were right in making their bid for power as soon as they did in Germany. In Berlin they made two attempts and on both occasions they were defeated. It was only in Munich that they met with any temporary success, and here too they have now collapsed, leaving behind them a record that will not inspire other parts of Germany to follow their example. There may no doubt be other outbreaks of Spartacism in Germany, but the Spartacists have no leaders of outstanding ability such as Lenin, and the great body of public opinion in Germany, profiting by the lesson of Russia, is solid against them, except as a counsel of utter despair. In Germany, at any rate, unless the Allies deliberately foment it, Bolshevism is discredited and is now on the wane. Bolshevism thrives only on success and

continuous success, and cannot survive the repeated failures it has already met with in Germany.

In Hungary, too, as far as can be judged at the moment of writing, the Communist Government has ended in a fiasco. It is probably true to say that Communism there was stronger before it came into power than afterwards. The prestige of Count Karolyi's Government had gone, and many people, for purely national reasons, may have been prepared to welcome a new experiment to test its effect on Western Europe. For that very reason there was a feeling of uneasiness in many quarters lest General Smuts's mission to Buda-Pest might increase the prestige of Bela-Kun's fantastic Government, but later events and the firm line of action pursued by the Allies have removed these fears and exposed the inherent weakness of Bolshevism when faced with any armed force backed by a determined Government. The failure of Bolshevism both in Germany and Hungary has gone far to ruin Bolshevik prestige in Europe; and Bolshevism is finding itself more and more driven back into Russia, there to defend itself against the population over which it has tyrannised so ruthlessly for more than eighteen months.

## II. THE BOLSHEVIST GOVERNMENT AND PEACE

If the prestige of Bolshevism in Europe has suffered, what has been the effect in Russia? A great deal will depend on the course of events in the near future, but to understand the position it is necessary to review the recent history of Bolshevik prestige in Russia. At the time of the armistice with Germany Bolshevik prestige was extraordinarily low. It was clear to every intelligent Russian that the defeat of Germany had been due to the superior strength of the Allied armies, and it was universally expected that a small portion of the victorious troops would instantly be diverted to Russia. Mothers comforted their children in Petrograd with the assurance that soon the English would be coming, and the Bolshevik authorities there were making every preparation for evacuating the city. Time passed and nothing was done; even the opening of the Dardanelles made no appreciable difference. So the Bolsheviks took heart again, and, when the Peace Conference opened its sittings in Paris in January, Lenin had had time to devise a new policy to suit the turn of events. Peace overtures were made to the Allies and hints were given that the Soviet Government was prepared



to grant concessions. It was in this atmosphere that the Prinkipo proposal was launched. To the Bolsheviks it seemed too good to be true and their first impulse was to see in it nothing but a trap. They therefore hesitated to give any reply, until it became clear to them, from the indignation of their opponents, that the proposal meant nothing more nor less than what it said, and that here was a way of regaining their prestige in Russia and discomfiting their opponents. In Siberia, at Archangel, and in the South of Russia, there was a feeling of anger and despair, only relieved when it became evident that the Prinkipo proposal had lapsed and that nothing further was likely to come of it.

Meanwhile, however, Lenin was not idle. His peace propaganda became more active. Stories were spread of the strength of the Red Army and the way the other Socialist parties in Russia were uniting with the Soviet Government against Admiral Kolchak and against any form of foreign intervention. At the same time the press contained many references to the visit of certain American journalists to Moscow, who, it was said, had brought back to Paris terms of peace from Lenin.

These rumours were finally dispelled by the British Prime Minister's welcome speech in the

House of Commons, in which he definitely repudiated any idea of recognising the Soviet Government and reiterated his intention of supporting those Russian forces opposed to it.

It is our business (he declared), since we asked them to take this step, since we promised support to them if they took this step, and since by taking this stand they contributed largely to the triumph of the Allies, it is our business to stand by our friends. . . . Therefore I do not in the least regard it as a departure from the fundamental policy of Great Britain not to interfere in the internal affairs of any land that we should support General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak.

Such a direct statement from the Prime Minister should mean a final blow to Bolshevik prestige in Europe, followed as it has been by the collapse of the Soviet Governments in Munich and Buda-Pest. It now remains for Russia to shake herself free from the malady that has not only ruined her but has been disturbing the peace of Europe for many months past. It is not only the future of Russia that is at stake in the struggle against Bolshevism in Russia, but the future of Europe also, for until Russia is restored and able to resume her normal relations with the civilised world there can be no real peace in Europe, neither can the League of Nations be erected on a firm and lasting foundation. If only for that reason

the struggle that Russians are now making in the North, in the East and in the South against Bolshevik oppression should engage the interest of the whole world.

### III. THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIST MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA

At the beginning of November 1917 the Bolshevik movement in Russia came on a wave so swift and unexpected that the Provisional Government was swept off its feet quite unprepared to cope with the situation. Most people expected that it would disappear almost as quickly as it had come when once an armed force was organised against it. But November and December passed and the opposition melted away. It was only in Southern Russia, where General Alexeyev had rallied round him a few hundred officers, that any opposition was even visible. The Cossacks, who had been regarded as the bulwark against Bolshevism, collapsed without a struggle and went over to the other side, and before long the Bolsheviks spread throughout Siberia and made themselves masters of Kiev.

It was then that the Germans intervened in spite of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk and checked the spread of Bolshevism farther West. They

occupied Kiev and in the name of Ukrainian Independence pushed their armies forward as far as the Don on the East and the Government of Kursk on the North. There were signs at one time that they contemplated occupying Moscow and restoring the monarchy, and it is generally believed that their ambassador at Moscow, Herr Helfferich, advised taking this step. Whatever steps, however, the Germans may have taken to overthrow Bolshevism in different parts of Russia have no connection with the genuine Russian Anti-Bolshevist movements. General Alexeyev, and after him General Denikin, consistently refused to receive any support or to come to any terms with the Germans and made it known that, should the Germans approach the territory controlled by the Volunteer Army, they would be opposed in exactly the same way as the Bolsheviks. General Krasnov, it is true, was not so uncompromising, but the Volunteer Army condemned his actions, and there was constant friction between the Volunteer Army and the high command of the Don Cossacks until General Krasnov was removed some months ago.

The first Anti-Bolshevist organisation in Russia, apart from the Volunteer Army in the South, came into being in Moscow about April 1918. As the Bolsheviks suppressed any public organisa-



tions opposed to their regime, any such bodies had to be secretly organised and their very existence remained a secret during the whole of the summer of 1918. It was not until later, when the individual members of the organisation, finding it impossible to continue work in Moscow, scattered to different parts of Russia, to the North, to the South, and to Siberia, that the existence of the body they had represented became publicly known.

The National Centre, which was formed in Moscow during the spring and summer of 1918, was a coalition of various political parties and organisations. It consisted chiefly of members of the Cadet Party and Moderate Socialist parties such as the Right Social Revolutionaries, the Populist Socialists and the Right Mensheviks, as opposed to the Menshevik Internationalists, headed by Martoff, who has now come to terms of a sort with the Soviet Government. It also included a large organisation, known as the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, which was Socialist in character. Its object was to co-operate with the Anti-Bolshevist movement in Eastern Russia which had arisen as a result of the action of the Czecho-Slovaks, with the Volunteer Army in Southern Russia, and with the Provisional Government of those parts of Northern

Russia which were freed from the Bolsheviks on the arrival of the Allied expedition. The immediate object was to co-ordinate the policy of all the Anti-Bolshevist movements, the main principle being the restoration of order by armed force and, when that had been accomplished, the summoning of a Constituent Assembly to determine the future form of government.

#### IV. THE MOVEMENT IN SIBERIA

The movement in Siberia, though it came into existence at a later stage than that in the South of Russia, is the most important and may be dealt with first. It is perhaps more directly concerned with the work of the National Centre in Moscow in the summer of 1918. In order to disentangle the history of what happened at Omsk in November 1918 it is essential to trace the movement back to the plans elaborated by the National Centre in Moscow.

When the Soviet Government in Petrograd dissolved the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, a temporary Siberian Government, which was purely Socialist in character, was established at Tomsk. This Government had but a short existence. It collapsed before the Bolshevik wave that swept right across Siberia. The members

of the Government disappeared, some retiring into the background, others making their way to Vladivostok.

The success of the Czecho-Slovaks in Western Siberia meant the reappearance of the old Siberian Government that now took up its headquarters at Omsk. This Government was headed by Volodski, a Siberian lawyer, but was less Socialist and more bourgeois than the former Government which had been dispersed by the Bolsheviks. The reason for this was that the new Government was a compromise between the Social Revolutionaries and the military elements that had begun to form the nucleus of a Russian army to fight the Bolsheviks. Admiral Kolchak became Minister of War in the new Siberian Government, having come from the Far East as soon as communication had been opened up between Omsk and Vladivostok.

Meanwhile in Eastern Russia a new Government had been formed in the territory liberated by the Czecho-Slovaks east of the Volga. The conflict between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Bolsheviks came to a head at the end of May; and by July the Czecho-Slovaks, joined by a small Russian force, called the "People's Army," had occupied Syzran, Samara, Simbirsk, and even Kazan. These successes, though they were not

maintained for long, led to a meeting on September 24 at Ufa, in the rear of the Czechoslovak front, when an All-Russian Directory, consisting of Vologodski, Avksentyev, Chaikovski, Astrov, and General Boldyrev, was established. Soon afterwards the Directory moved its headquarters from Ufa to Omsk.

The compromise adopted at Ufa contained no elements of permanence. According to the compromise the Directory was to be the All-Russian Government, while the Omsk Government, which was in reality a very much stronger body, was to be merely a "business" Siberian Government for the purpose of local administration. The establishment of the Directory, in which the Social Revolutionaries were all-powerful, Zenzinov having taken the place of Astrov who had gone to the South of Russia to join General Denikin, was not in accordance with the arrangements made by the National Centre in Moscow, which had aimed at a much broader coalition of parties under the supreme command of General Alexeyev. Moreover, the subordinate position into which the Omsk Government was forced did not meet with any favour from the military elements who were convinced that the new Socialist Directory would never succeed in building up a strong, well-disciplined army, the prime necessity of the movement.



These suspicions were still further aggravated by the insidious propaganda of Chernov, the evil genius of the Social Revolutionary Party.

It was clear that sooner or later a change was inevitable. Officers, who had been serving in the so-called "People's Army" on the Volga front, which had been practically controlled by the Social Revolutionaries, had made their way to Omsk, and were determined to secure some form of Government which would definitely break with the committee system in the army and ensure the enforcement of strong military discipline. In the Omsk Government there was one man, Admiral Kolchak, who, both by his character and ability, was singled out as the only man capable of assuming supreme control. On November 18 the change took place. During the previous night Avksentyev and two other Socialist members of the Directory were arrested by a group of Cossack officers. A meeting of the Siberian Government was then held to discuss the situation. It was decided that the Directory had collapsed and that its powers should henceforth be concentrated in the hands of one man — Admiral Kolchak — who thereupon assumed the title of *Verkhovni Pravitel* (Supreme Regent).

Irregular as such a *coup d'état* may have been, it may be said in defence that the times were

irregular, and that the Directory, elected by only a small group of former members of the Constituent Assembly at Ufa, had no better constitutional basis to govern the whole of Russia than Admiral Kolchak possessed. The one thing needed was a firm hand to organise an army and an administration, and it was obvious that the Directory would never succeed in doing this. Admiral Kolchak's action has since been justified by success; for he has not only achieved a remarkable series of victories in the field, but has rallied the vast majority of the population, including the important Co-operative Societies, to his side.

Since Admiral Kolchak assumed office there have been no further political crises in Siberia. The Government is in the hands of a strong ruler and its success depends upon his wisdom and ability. Kolchak was not hitherto widely known even in Russia. He had played no part in politics and it was uncertain how he would shape. Determined he would certainly be, but would it be the determination of a Napoleon or a George Washington? A recent letter from Siberia characterises him as follows: "Kolchak is a great man. He is cultured, not ambitious at all, with great moral force, highly strung and an ardent patriot. In internal political and purely Army

‘ matters, of which he knows very little, he is very careful, listens to advice, consults people, reflects over it and never acts on impulse. Certainly he makes mistakes, but he recognises them, alters them and does not insist on them.’

Admiral Kolchak has had a difficult path to tread during the last few months and it would be idle to pretend that all is well with the administration. There are still many abuses to be removed and many defects in organisation, but those who have been on the spot report that there is a new atmosphere of hope, that confidence is being restored, justice has been re-established, taxes are being collected, and now that a beginning has been made there is a determination to carry the work through.

Admiral Kolchak has defined in various public addresses the main outlines of his political programme. When accepting power from the Council of Ministers, he said:

Accepting this cross of power, in extremely difficult conditions of civil war and utter disorganisation of the State life, I declare to the population that I will follow neither the road of reaction nor the disastrous way of party politics. My chief aims are the creation of a strong, fighting army, victory over Bolshevism, and the establishment of law and order founded on right. This will enable the nation to choose freely the sort of Gov-

ernment it prefers and to realise the great ideals of freedom now proclaimed throughout the whole world.

In a further speech at the end of February he declared:

In the Russia that is to be only a democratic *régime* is possible. The main task of the Government is to establish universal suffrage in the sphere of democratic self-government, and thoroughly progressive legislation in the sphere of labour and agrarian questions.

On the land question he has made equally satisfactory statements:

The two years of revolution have implanted in me the firm conviction that the land question cannot be left in its former condition, but must be reviewed and based on new principles. These principles are a matter for the future National Constituent Assembly; the present Government can only solve the question practically as occasion arises. My Government regards it as an indisputable fact that small peasant proprietorship is the base of the country's prosperity and the Government will aid it at the expense of the large owners.

He has further pledged himself to the election of a Constituent Assembly, when order has been restored, in the following words:

I declare to you that the aim of the Government which I represent is to give to the country, so sorely tried by the Revolution, order, right and law, and to secure for



the Russian people an opportunity, without violence from any party, freely to declare its will through a Constituent Assembly.

## V. THE VOLUNTEER ARMY IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA

In the first days of the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd General Alexeyev made his way to Novocherkassk in the South of Russia and gathered round him a handful of officers. The Don and Kuban Cossacks had not at that time succumbed to the infection of Bolshevism and it was hoped that among the Cossacks a rallying-ground might be found against the Bolsheviks. About a month afterwards Alexeyev was joined by Korniloff who had escaped from imprisonment in Bykhov. They soon took up their headquarters at Rostov and entered into close relations with Kaledin, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks at Novocherkassk. At that time the Volunteer Army under Alexeyev and Korniloff numbered only a few hundred and was provided neither with munitions nor other military equipment.

The hopes they had placed on the steadfastness of the Don Cossacks were, however, soon belied. The Bolsheviks made active propaganda amongst the young Cossacks and misrepresented to them

the aims of their leaders and of the Volunteer Army Generals. The Cossacks are an independent people. They have always led somewhat of a roving existence and for that very reason under the old regime they enjoyed a status altogether different from that of other communities in Russia. It is true that the theories of Bolshevism were not likely to make any lasting appeal to them, but the spirit of revolt was in the air and the Bolsheviks were prepared to use this spirit for their own purposes. Kaledin, seeing the apparent hopelessness of the position, shot himself on February 11 at Novocherkassk, perhaps in the hope that this might bring the Cossacks to their senses. His tragic death did have a momentary effect on them; for a few weeks they rallied, but then again the same spirit of disorder gained the upper hand.

A few days after Kaledin's death the Volunteer Army was forced to move its headquarters from Rostov to the Stavropol Government. Their forces at this time numbered not more than 2,600 all told. Here, without any sanitary arrangements and constantly harassed by Bolshevik bands which controlled the main roads and railways, they kept up a dogged resistance entirely cut off from any means of help. At the beginning of March news reached them that the Kuban

Government had fallen and that the Bolsheviki were masters of Ekaterinodar. Korniloff, reinforced by Kuban detachments that had fled from Ekaterinodar, determined to retake the city. On April 13 the decisive battle was fought for its possession. The Volunteer Army was unsuccessful and was forced to retreat, Korniloff having been killed on the field of battle.

It was at this time that the Volunteer Army heard the welcome news that the Don Cossacks had risen in revolt against the Bolsheviki. Novocherkassk changed hands several times, but was finally held by the Cossacks. Meanwhile the Volunteer Army, in spite of its recent reverse at Ekaterinodar, was gradually growing in numbers, officers making their way from Roumania and the Ukraine to join them. During the next few months Denikin, who had succeeded Korniloff in the command of the Volunteer Army, organised the army into a real, modern fighting force. The Germans, meanwhile, since he had refused to come to any arrangement with them, endeavoured, by many devious ways, to hamper his organisation of the army.

In the summer Denikin, having captured Bataisk, again advanced into the Kuban district, and, after a series of battles, Ekaterinodar came into his hands on August 15. From Ekaterino-

dar he advanced to Novorossisk on August 26, thus reaching the coast of the Black Sea. During the autumn and winter Denikin gradually cleared Kuban, Stavropol and the Northern Caucasus of the Bolsheviks.

The history of the Don Cossacks during the summer of 1918 was rather different from that of the Volunteer Army. The German troops, having penetrated as far as the Donets basin, came into touch with the Don Cossacks at Novocherkassk, and it was through their influence that the reactionary General Krasnov was appointed Ataman of the Don. The agreement was that the Germans would supply him with munitions against the Bolsheviks, the former hoping that through the Don they might bring over the Volunteer Army to their side. In this, however, they were unsuccessful, and, by the time of the armistice in November 1918, the Don Cossacks were able to shake themselves altogether free from German influence.

Once the Germans had disappeared, closer relations were established between Denikin and the Don Cossacks, but Krasnov's reactionary policy, and that of the reactionary generals and politicians by whom he was surrounded, led to constant friction between his staff and that of the Volunteer Army. This was only removed when



Krasnov retired early in 1919 and General Bogayevski, who had previously fought in the Volunteer Army, took his place. Bogayevski lost no time in making it clear that from henceforward the army of the Don Cossacks would work in the closest accord with the Volunteer Army.

The military history of the Volunteer Army is an epic even more romantic than the exploits of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia. The difficulties they had to overcome were enormous, and on many occasions one would have thought the stoutest hearts must have failed. The chief credit is due to Alexeyev, who organized the army during the most difficult months until his death from strain and overwork on October 8, 1918, and to Denikin, who, since he succeeded Alexeyev, has held the army together both by his soldierly qualities and his political commonsense. As far back as August 19, 1918, Denikin defined the aims of the Volunteer Army in the following words:

The Volunteer Army cannot become a weapon for one or another political party or public organisation. Then it would cease to be Russia's State Army. The Army will never try to restrain other people's thoughts and consciences. The Army says to you simply and honestly: "Whether you belong to the Left or the Right, love your tortured native land and help to save her."

General Denikin's present Administration with its headquarters at Ekaterinodar should not be regarded as an independent Government; it is purely of a temporary character designed to facilitate the work of the Volunteer Army until union is effected with Kolchak's troops, as Denikin has openly placed himself under the authority of Kolchak. The Administration itself that is attached to the Volunteer Army represents all shades of political opinion, from Mr. Sazonov to Messrs. Astrov and Stepanov, both of whom are Cadets and members of the National Centre. The main lines of the policy of the Administration, as published in the *Times* on May 5, are the following: (1) Abolition of Bolshevik anarchy and institution of law and order; (2) Reconstruction of a powerful, united and indivisible Russia; (3) Convocation of a People's Assembly based on universal suffrage; (4) Decentralisation by means of wide regional autonomy and liberal local self-government; (5) Guarantee of full civil and general freedom; (6) Immediate agrarian reforms with a view to meeting demands for land by the working-classes; (7) Immediate Labour legislation, securing the working-classes from exploitation by the Government or by capitalists.

## VI. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN RUSSIA

The Provisional Government in Northern Russia, comprising the Archangel and Murmansk areas, came into existence at the beginning of August 1918 at the time of the Allied expedition. Chaikovski was chosen as head of the new Government and the Ministry formed by him consisted almost entirely of Social Revolutionaries. Chaikovski himself is a veteran member of the Social Revolutionary Party and before he proceeded to Archangel was in association with the National Centre in Moscow. The policy pursued by his Government is based on the decisions formulated in Moscow and closely follows the declarations of Kolchak which have already been quoted. The main principles are the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks until they have been overthrown, and, when this has been accomplished, the summoning of a Constituent Assembly. All the evidence goes to show that the Government, which has since its formation been remodelled on a broader basis, closely reflects the wishes of the local population.

## VII. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS

The Governments of Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin and Mr. Chaikovski include the whole of the Russian forces at war with the Bolsheviks. There are other Anti-Bolshevist forces in the field consisting of Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Ukrainians, but so far there is no co-ordination between them and the Russian forces, nor are their aims the same. The peoples of the Baltic Provinces and the Ukrainians all claim complete independence of Russia and refuse even to discuss the question of federation. As a result of the collapse of the former Russian State the doctrine of self-determination has run riot in Russia, and new national formations have come into existence which, before the Bolshevik Revolution, never claimed anything more than federation. It is clear that no one formula can cover these several problems and that each of them must be settled on its merits. There are many interests to be considered — national, political and economic — and it is certain that Russian interests cannot be completely ignored without causing trouble in the future. If a solution is to be found in Paris it would be as well for the future security of the territories concerned



that it should not fly in the face of the declarations already made by the official representatives in Paris of the Russian Governments, who, even though their Governments have not been recognised by the Allies, can rightly claim to speak for the whole of the Anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia.

The Russian representatives in Paris have formed themselves into a small central committee presided over by Prince Lvov, who is assisted by Mr. Sazonov, Mr. Maklakov, and Mr. Chaikovski. Prince Lvov represents the former Provisional Government, of which he was the first Prime Minister, Mr. Sazonov the Governments of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin, and Mr. Chaikovski the Government of Northern Russia. So long as no Russian Government is officially recognised by the Allies the representatives of Russia have not been admitted to the Peace Conference, but the Russian Committee has explained its views on the main questions concerning the future territories of Russia. The Russian point of view on the self-determination of the border nationalities, with the exception of Poland and Finland, the latter having now been recognised by both the British, French and American Governments, is as follows: "They are prepared to regard as *de facto* Governments the authorities set up by these nationalities, in so far as they are

inspired by democratic principles and enjoy the support of the population they govern, and they are in consequence ready to give their assistance to these nationalities in the matter of their political and economic organisation." Though this declaration has not been accepted by the nationalities concerned, who still maintain their demand for complete independence, it might perhaps provide a basis for further negotiation.

### VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing sketch of the Anti-Bolshevist movements in Russia has endeavoured to show how the opposition to the Bolsheviks took shape and along what lines it has developed. The Bolsheviks by their uncompromising and irreconcilable attitude drove every other party into violent opposition and united many who, under the Provisional Government, had been unable to sink their differences. Amongst the non-Socialist parties in Russia there were certainly never any illusions about the Bolsheviks, and those parties who stood to the Right of Kerenski frequently urged him to adopt more vigorous measures against them. But before the Bolshevik Revolution all members of the Soviet were leagued together under the name of "*tovarishchi*" (com-

rades), and, no matter how far removed they were from one another in policy, there was with the majority a strong disinclination to take action against any *tovarishch* for fear that domestic differences within the Socialist parties might lead to the triumph of the hated *burzhui* (bourgeoisie). Apart from small groups of Socialists, such as those who rallied round Plekhanov, the Soviet as a whole, even when it was predominantly Menshevik, refused to take stock of its actual position and sever all connection with the extreme Left, whose policy, it was known even at that time, was entirely incompatible with that of the main body of Socialist opinion.

This lesson was not learned until it was too late; until the Bolsheviks had dispersed the Constituent Assembly and openly taken their stand against Social Democracy. It was not till then that Socialist opinion united against the Bolsheviks, who singled out their opponents in the Socialist camp for exceptionally harsh punishment. These founders of the Third International, who, to show their complete dissociation from the "Social-traitors" of the Second International, erased the name of Social-Democrat from their programme, have ever since covered with abuse the Socialists of the whole world who have not completely thrown in their lot with them. And

yet in other countries leading Socialists, such as M. Longuet in France, still work for an understanding with the Third International. While advocating the re-establishment of the Second International, they favour a policy that would gradually merge it in the Third. Even when the Bolshevik *tovarishch* brands his Socialist opponent as an enemy and a traitor, the latter refuses to break the spell that would bind them all together under the misleading name of *tovarishchi*. So long as Anti-Bolshevist Socialists continue this nominal connection with the Bolsheviks it is not surprising that those who do not examine closely the differences between them should be inclined to class them all as Bolsheviks.

It is this which lies at the back of much of what has happened in Russia since the organised struggle against Bolshevism began, and it goes a long way towards explaining the reason for Kolchak's *coup d'état* in November 1918. Chernov's internationalism was an impossible weapon with which to combat Bolshevism; if Russia was to be restored and liberated from the Bolsheviks it could only be done by a vigorous national and patriotic movement. That is the essence of Kolchak's programme, and those Socialists who take their stand on a national basis, as do Mr. Chaikovski and many others, are prepared to sup-



port the aims which both Kolchak and Denikin have proclaimed.

Simply because the Anti-Bolshevist movements, as represented by Kolchak and Denikin, have put the question of firm government and a strong military force in the forefront of their programme, many people have jumped to the conclusion that they are reactionaries. Many English Liberals have taken up this cry and tend to sympathise more with those who are content with wholesale professions of democracy than with those who make vigorous action their main object. Russian Liberals, who in principle accept the same democratic programme as advanced Liberals in this country, are rightly indignant when their present attitude meets with constant suspicion here. They see the dangers threatening their country, the ignorance and demoralisation of the masses, and the urgent necessity for a firm hand in restoring and maintaining order until Russia has had time to breathe again and recover her balance. They do not wish to repeat the mistakes of the Provisional Government and lead their country back again on the road which ends in anarchy.



















**University of Toronto  
Library**

---

**DO NOT  
REMOVE  
THE  
CARD  
FROM  
THIS  
POCKET**

---

**Acme Library Card Pocket**  
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"  
Made by **LIBRARY BUREAU**

